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Älykkäiden laitteiden päämääränä on tehdä elämästämme sekä tehokkaampaa että tuot-
toisampaa. Samaan aikaan ne tuovat mukanaan mahdollisuuksia ja vaaroja. Kuitenkin 
yksityisyyden, mitä tietoja varjelemme ja haluamme piilottaa, ja luottamuksen, kuinka 
suhtaudumme muihin käyttäjiin tai itse sovelluksiin, jolloin näiden välille syntyy riip-
puvuussuhteita, jonka mukaan valitsemme kumpaa vaalimme enemmän. Tällä hetkellä 
kaikki lähestymistavat luottamuksen arviointiin pyörivät tunnettujen arvojen olemassa-
olosta, esimerkiksi olettamukseen, että kaikki sosiaaliseen kanssakäymiseen liittyvät 
applikaatiot omaavat yhtenäisen luottamustason (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Tämä väittä-
mä luo illuusion ja efektin, että alustoja käyttävät käyttäjät eivät pysty erottamaan muita 
luotettavia käyttäjiä, vaan he tekevät kaikki päätöksensä rajoitetulla tiedolla laajasta 
käyttäjäkunnasta, esimerkiksi muiden käyttäjien tai itse sovelluksen suosituksesta. 
Tämän diplomityön tarkoituksena on arvioida Social Devices- konseptin heijastamia 
luottamus- ja yksityisyysongelmia. Laitteiden kerätessä läheisyystietoja muilta laitteilta, 
alustan vaatimukset yksityisyydelle riippuvat suositellusta yksityisyyden tasosta. Itse 
asiakasohjelmalla on perustoimintona automaattisesti ja asynkronisesti hyväksyä pyyn-
nöt ja toivomuksena myös muodostaa muiden laitteiden välille yhteyksiä. 
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The purpose of smart devices is to make our lives both more efficient and effective. At 
the same time, this raises real opportunities and, more importantly, dangers. However, 
the balance between privacy and trust changes depending on the use of a selected de-
vice. For the time being, all the approaches for assessing trust revolve around the exist-
ence of known values. Typically, these are either users / peers in a trusted network 
providing measures for asserting that particular trust value or the assumption that all 
social-based applications share the same levels of trust. This triggers the illusion and the 
effect that users using these platforms have difficulties differentiating between trusted 
users. Instead, they make their own decisions based solely on their limited knowledge of 
the potentially wide user base or relying on recommendations set either by other users 
or possibly by the application itself. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the projections of trust and privacy issues that 
have arisen with new implementations of the Social Devices concept. With devices 
gathering proximity information about other nearby devices, the platform’s require-
ments for privacy vary, depending on the level of recommended protection. The client 
itself has a basic functionality of autonomously and asynchronously accepting requests 
and desirably forming connections to other devices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past couple of decades, smart device technologies have evolved into a more 
consumer-friendly environment, where consumers want immediate access into a social-
network type coaction and are willing to share vast amounts of media in various catego-
ries.  Naturally, this type of digital sharing extends beyond simple consumer media 
sharing rather quickly as options and possibilities grow [1]. 
As several devices are turning into smart devices, the days when only mobile phones 
were involved are history. Everyday household appliances such as televisions and re-
frigerators are seeing the new age of smart devices along with advanced automotive 
technology, not forgetting individual items such as smartwatches. Generally speaking, 
anything that is equipped with sufficient and capable hardware and feasible networking 
capabilities can be considered a smart device. 
With smarter devices we, both as individuals and groups, have accepted web services as 
a crucial part of our everyday lives. We are becoming more or less addicted to social 
interaction as we strive to share experiences and feelings while simultaneously staying 
in touch with people by using sites such as Facebook and Twitter. 
The Social Devices concept was set up to research multiple areas of social interaction. 
These were based on discoveries with a lot of recent media coverage about unintention-
al leaks of organizational and personal data. Certain realizations were made early on. 
Users expect privacy solutions. Unfortunately, privacy, as an everyday concept, is not 
very clearly defined.  
Additionally to the research made for this thesis, another project was ongoing during the 
period of writing this thesis. The D2D project, better known as Device-to-Device 
Communications [21], was established to strive for an answer to the question of whether 
people could establish relevant direct connections between their devices without the 
explicit need for Internet connectivity. This led to the solutions described in this thesis 
on how successful connections could be first triggered and then established. The con-
cept which the D2D project came up with was similar to Media Share, which is also 
described in this thesis. 
The above-mentioned project was designed to fulfill the necessary requirements to act 
as a legitimate Social Device experience with capable, yet as modest devices as possi-
ble, with certain limitations; in this scenario, a specific Android version. The experi-
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ment itself was first demonstrated at Tampere University of Technology and then it 
progressed to other universities for stress testing.  
The interest of this experiment in terms of Pervasive Computing was to measure the 
capabilities and functionalities of the Device-to-Device app design, which provided 
ideal platforming ideas for future development, enabling the design and execution of 
more complex applications such as the Medical Dispenser, which will most probably be 
implemented at some time in the future. 
Furthermore, as smartphones and mobile devices have replaced traditional personal 
computers as the main means of accessing the web and other context-based services, a 
plethora of applications are already available for these devices and more become availa-
ble on a daily basis. Social Devices tackle the problematics of location privacy issues, 
which are critical especially in such pervasive communication systems and mobile 
communication networks. Fortunately, both of these have recently received a lot of at-
tention, leading to beneficial research and possible solutions. It became clear at the be-
ginning of this research and thesis that the best way to evaluate such problems is to use 
real-life settings as parameters. 
 
Figure 1.1: A use case example of a situation enriched by Social Devices interaction [2]. 
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Social Devices as a concept was established to study and define the social aspect of new 
powerful smart devices that use services similar to Facebook. Social Devices proposes 
an alternative approach where both people and devices would form themselves into a 
new system, where the devices proactively participate in social situations by enriching 
them in various ways. [2]. For example, the devices could participate in conversations 
or actually provide applications that promote socializing in different situations, as seen 
in Figure 1.1, which demonstrates such an application; in this type of scenario a group 
of individuals have come together. The system recognizes the situation and suggests the 
users take part in an event both suggested and made possible by their devices. 
In every app concept described in this thesis, a more or less obvious factor was hidden, 
namely, familiarity. We live and interact across a diverse set of physical spaces. The 
variety of how we formulate our personal meanings towards observable cues such as 
public-private, which was a key element in this research, is never-ending. We see peo-
ple around us every day and we share this space with those same people, which domi-
nate our perception of how we see these individuals. Whether they are friends, family, 
colleagues, or total strangers depends purely on how we observe them. 
This first purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the projections of trust and privacy issues 
that have arisen with the new implementations of the Social Devices concept. With de-
vices gathering proximity information about other nearby devices, the platform’s re-
quirements for privacy vary depending on the level of recommended protection. The 
client itself has the basic functionality of autonomously and asynchronously accepting 
requests and desirably forming connections to other devices. 
The second aim of this thesis is to present parts of the related concepts in Social Devic-
es and how they operate and interact. 
The thesis is structured as follows.  Section 2 is dedicated to introducing the Social De-
vices (SD) concept, which was originally the core idea for a variety of implementation 
possibilities which will be introduced below, such as OrchestratorJS (OJS) and the Ac-
tion-Oriented Programming model (AcOP). This section also clarifies the implementa-
tion architecture by explicating the functions of related components. 
Section 3 is designed to give an understanding of the concept of data minimization and 
how it affects Social Devices. Additionally, more specifically, it explains why gathering 
data is relevant in the first place and how proper data gathering should be initiated. 
For Section 4, a privacy / trust indicator will be introduced to enlighten how privacy and 
trust are seen in Social Device environments and furthermore to demerge the key factors 
of privacy and trust. 
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In Section 5, the infamous Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is covered in the light of 
several example Social Device concepts and implementations that all have the same 
basic functions of forming connections; but the application itself varies in a way that the 
required level of privacy or trust is different. Moreover, this section illustrates how pri-
vacy takes place in Social Device innovations. 
Section 6 draws conclusions and summarizes the thesis.  
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2. SOCIAL DEVICES 
This section is dedicated to introducing the concept of Social Devices with a specific 
prototype implementation: OrchestratorJS. Subsection 2.1 includes a general overview 
and requirements of Social Devices. Subsection 2.2 defines the underlying program-
ming model of the implementations and in subsection 2.3 the needs and characteristics 
of the implementations are discussed. OrchestratorJS implementations and actual archi-
tecture are described in detail in subsection 2.4. 
2.1 SD concept 
The concept of Social Devices was introduced by Mäkitalo et al. in [2]. The actual aim 
of Social Devices is using technology to enrich interactions either between devices or 
between devices and the user. Along with the concept, devices that are proactive and 
potentially context-aware can form a completely new socio-digital system, where it is 
possible for both users and devices to start interactions with either other devices or peo-
ple. Social Devices can enrich a simple device-to-device interaction by making it ex-
plicit to users, for example in face-to-face situations.
  
Figure 2.1: A demonstration of environments in which Social Devices can be used [2]. 
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Any interaction caused by Social Devices can be considered an action (explained in 
subsection 2.2). It is essential to understand that these actions may not functionally op-
erate the same way but they serve the same purpose: providing information to users in 
various socially interactive situations such as in large crowds, meet-and-greets, on the 
move, or in office environments, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. As mentioned above, in 
situations where people meet face to face, that particular interaction could for example 
be an acknowledgement of a greet by audio or exchanging business information in a 
conference. These interactions can be made even more extensive by adding actual sound 
to connecting devices when certain proximity factors are met, such as mobile phones 
and laptops. A new design could even be used in medical care, reminding individuals to 
take their daily dosage of medicine, which will be covered in a later section. 
Nowadays, most people own a mobile phone and carry it everywhere; they have become 
the perfect social devices. If the preconditions are met, other devices could be consid-
ered social as long as they have sufficient computational capacities and capabilities and 
the ability to interact with the surroundings and surrounding devices is ensured. For 
Social Devices, this means that it can be very heterogeneous and include very personal 
devices or the devices can be practically stationary and impersonal, located in public 
places like in a meeting room or a public library. This heterogeneity is shown best by 
the distinct resources of the devices. 
Furthermore, the surroundings where Social Devices operate can be adjusted quickly as 
users carry out their daily routines. The arbitrary nature of social encounters could lead 
to situations where devices quickly and repeatedly move in and out of range of each 
other, causing the actions of participating devices to change constantly. 
2.2 Requirements and Characteristics 
Standardized requirements and characteristics are essential as the requirements for im-
plementing applications in a Social Devices environment are derived from both of these. 
Devices have their own identities as users have preferences regarding their own devices, 
thus the identity can show which device is allowed to do what. Furthermore, identities 
can be used for indicating the actual proximity of the physical user. It works as follows: 
the more personal the device is to the user, the better it is for calculating the proximity 
approximation.  
For instance, pinpointing a laptop connection can be much harder to calculate than a 
mobile device connection based more on proximity, such as Bluetooth, and here a spe-
cific registry is introduced in order to keep track of devices. However, this raises a seri-
ous privacy issue, which will be discussed later in Section 5. 
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As a precondition for Social Devices, certain proximity of users and their devices must 
be met before any social interaction can commence. Each device calculates its own 
proximity with respect to each device willing to participate in a desired action. The 
proximity information is forwarded to a centralized server that maintains the proximity 
information of each device. From this information, a mathematical graph is formed 
where nodes denote devices and edges denote the mutual distance between devices, 
reducing the required computing on the device end. 
Additionally to registering and reporting the proximity of other devices, the devices 
have to provide the server with necessary information regarding action preconditions, 
which define what is expected from the participants of the action that is occurring. This 
form is also known as ‘action descriptions’ or ‘action body’ and is covered in more 
depth in subsection 2.3. Enabling and installing multiple interfaces and capabilities can 
be done by the owner of a social device, making it easy to choose and moderate inter-
faces, and select the privileges that the application can access. 
Moreover, the system needs a means to determine which devices are able and willing to 
participate in an action. This can be solved by including information on the logical ex-
pression of the devices in the precondition part of the action description. As the envi-
ronment is usually mostly dynamic, more information is needed from the device, which 
is handled by monitoring the device states. States may vary from a Boolean value to any 
abstract value, which indicates for example if a device is on silent mode or not. 
Executing actions requires additional coordination and orchestration for the devices, 
which is solved by defining a platform with a built-in coordination method. As the de-
vices do not handle the configurations and decisions themselves, even the most modest 
devices can act as social devices. 
2.3  OrchestratorJS 
The concept, characteristics, and requirements of Social Devices were introduced 
above. This section aims to elucidate the requirements by showing the actual architec-
ture and implementation of OrchestratorJS, with reference to [9] and [14] unless stated 
otherwise. 
Orchestrator.js coordination middleware is especially designed to support the Social 
Devices concept by offering tools for implementing interactions between devices and 
people and for observing situations when these interactions should be proactively trig-
gered. Although Social Device applications differ from traditional mobile apps, the Or-
chestrator.js can still be used for the quick development of heterogeneous multi–device 
applications, as the lightweight server can easily be hosted individually for each purpose 
[9].  
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Moreover, the developer need not pay too much attention to the execution model of 
Social Device apps, but can instead focus on a single application, and host it on any 
regular computer, such as a living room media center for example. The main task of 
Orchestrator.js is to maintain a persistent connection to devices, store applications, store 
the contextual information of devices, and offer a means for triggering the applications. 
Moreover, Orchestrator.js (OJS) offers tools for developers to implement, test, and de-
ploy their applications [9]. 
The basic operations of OJS, illustrated in Figure 2.2, are as follows: as devices connect 
to OJS, they measure the context with their sensors and report this to the selected De-
vice Registry, which will be explained below. When the values of data change, meaning 
that new values replace the old values, the Device Registry publishes the changes 
through a pub / sub API. 
 
Figure 2.2: A diagram of OJS operations [9]. 
 
When the applications run in a cloud they receive events through this pub / sub API and 
simultaneously monitor other sources such as polling with HTTP. When OJS receives a 
trigger, it fetches resources from repositories. After all these steps have been carried out, 
OJS begins the coordination process by commanding participants with their capabilities. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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2.3.1 Architecture 
“Orchestrator.js (OJS) offers a web-based IDE for implementing apps in a heterogene-
ous, multi-user, and multi-device environment.” [9]. Not only can it be used for the im-
plementations themselves, but also for testing. With an IDE, it is relatively easy to mon-
itor device states, read debug messages from a console, and trigger interactions for a 
predefined set of devices. 
As OJS is based on Node.js, which is a server–side JavaScript platform, the communi-
cation itself operates through Socket.IO, a non-standardized protocol for relaying events 
between device and server. With this protocol stack, it becomes highly efficient to exe-
cute input / output operations between OJS and a selection of devices.  
Additionally, with Orchestrator.js it is easy to implement context-aware applications for 
a heterogeneous set of devices. Through an API, multiple devices constantly report their 
state to the Orchestrator.js Device Registry, which publishes updates whenever the con-
textual data of the devices change. 
2.3.2 AcOP Execution Model 
The applications in Orchestrator.js are based on the Action-Oriented Programming 
Model (AcOP). This programming model includes the following three main concepts 
(an illustration of the concept is presented in Figure 2.3): 
 
Figure 2.3: Illustration of AcOP model concepts [9]. 
 
Apps - monitor device contexts, and outside sources like social media services, such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and so on. Based on the observations and logic defined by the de-
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veloper, the app triggers actions. Thus the app defines when and what interactions (ac-
tions) should take place. 
Social Device apps are extremely modular, and thus the execution model of Social De-
vice apps differs from traditional applications. Social Device apps mainly run inside a 
cloud where observer components monitor contextual data and, based on developer- 
defined logic, schedule interactions between users and devices. Hence, the apps are the 
top-level components that select when and what interactions will be scheduled and for 
whom.  
Social Device functionality, however, is not entirely tied to apps, and interactions can 
be triggered by other components, like other interactions for instance. Typically, the 
apps are personal, meaning that users can start an instance for themselves and grant 
permissions to monitor their personal data.  
However, developers can also implement apps that monitor data from multiple users, or 
data from external sources. Naturally, the users have to enable and grant permission to 
use their personal data with these non-user-specific apps too. 
Actions - define how the devices interact with each other as well as with users. An ac-
tion can be very short, like a simple greeting, or longlasting, like a game. The operation 
principle is based on modularity, encapsulating the interacting device-to-device behav-
ior, and defining roles, parameters, and preconditions. Actions define the joint behavior 
of multiple devices, and interactions between people. 
Roles determine each device’s part in an action; for instance, in a media-sharing action, 
the users share pieces of data with one another and the roles define which device shares 
what and which devices have access to that piece of data. In Social Device environ-
ments, a precondition works as part of an action, defining what is expected from each 
device participating in the action. 
Capabilities - are used to describe how a device appears in the system, what a device 
can or is allowed to do, and in which interactions the device can take part. The capabil-
ity can either be very generic, like a talking capability that allows the device to speak, or 
more specific, like the Attend capability that allows the device to participate in a co-op 
game, for instance. 
For implementation purposes, the capabilities manifest as interfaces consisting of opera-
tions, making it a contract of operations relating to a specific device and its capabilities. 
As the AcOP model does not define one true interface programming language, the 
communication protocols between server and client are likely to differ in the program-
ming languages they use. 
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The number of interfaces or the capabilities is not defined by the model, as a device can 
only be invoked through its interfaces, rendering useless devices that have no capability 
to participate in an action. With reusable capabilities, any developer can write new ac-
tions without implementing a device-specific code. 
2.3.3 Invoking Web Applications through REST and NodeJS 
This subsection is dedicated to creating an in-depth view and understanding of both 
REST (Representational State Transfer), which is an architectural style used in software 
engineering giving a coordinated set of constraints in designing components, and Node 
JS, an asynchronous event-driven framework; and, finally, more specifically how these 
two components are invaluable in Social Device development. 
The concept of REST was introduced by Fielding in [16]. The component or rather the 
tool called REST will be described below since it is essential for Social Device devel-
opment in order to enable swift development and interactive modules for mobile social-
ly primed products.  
REST - When RESTful services are built, certain HTTP methods are introduced to con-
struct a more uniform interface to meet the constraints and provide counterparts for 
noun-based resource actions. The primary and most commonly used methods are GET, 
POST, PUT, and DELETE, which correspond to read, create, update, and delete opera-
tions. An overall perspective of the methods as well as a closer appraisal of how REST 
is connected to Social Devices will be covered in the next section. 
GET - This particular method is one used for reading or retrieving a physical represen-
tation of a chosen resource. With paths such as GET 
http://www.socialdevices.com/users/Limnell - the method returns a representation in 
either XML or JSON format with an HTTP response code, informing whether the exe-
cution was successful or not. Furthermore, as a GET request is only used for reading 
data and not actually changing it, these requests are considered to be safe to call without 
the risk of data modification or corruption. With GET, whether it is called once or ten 
times, the effect stays the same, as it is idempotent, meaning multiple identical requests 
cause the same results. 
POST - The POST verb or method is mostly utilized for creating new accessible re-
sources. In particular, POST is used for generating subordinate resources, meaning they 
are subordinate to some other parent resource. When creating new resources, the associ-
ations of the new resource with the particular parent object are taken care of by the ser-
vice by assigning an ID, e.g., a new resource URI, to the parent. 
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PUT - the PUT method is most often utilized for its updating capabilities. By using 
PUT in a chosen original resource, the representation is then updated into a new form of 
representation, differing from the original URI request body. Additionally, PUT also 
enables the creation of resources in situations where the resource ID is chosen by the 
client rather than by the server. 
DELETE - DELETE is the last of the four most commonly used HTTP methods. As its 
name denotes, the DELETE method deletes a resource identified by a URI. When delet-
ing resources, it is recommended to add a visual display of an HTTP status acknowl-
edgement confirming that a specific resource has been removed with, for example, a 
wrapped response. 
In terms of HTTP, DELETE operations are considered idempotent, meaning that if a 
resource is deleted, then it is permanently removed. Alternating = swapping / Altering = 
changing) the number of DELETE executions on a resource has no visible effects; the 
resource is removed after one single run. 
In addition, if the operation is meant to decrement a counter within a resource, the oper-
ation no longer remains idempotent. Arguably if an operation returns a not found status, 
the end-state of the resource is still the same so whether the DELETE is truly idempo-
tent or non-idempotent is a matter of preference. 
Finally, by understanding the principles of HTTP methods and how they correlate with 
RESTful environments, new architectures with a stateless nature can be introduced and 
used to offer more versatile web services with fewer restrictions and easy utilization. By 
simply modifying the executable code, servers can temporarily extend or customize the 
functionalities of a client.  
As clients ordinarily cannot tell whether they are connected to the end servers directly 
or to an intermediary, load balancing can be implemented to share caches, thus enabling 
the true nature of REST, which is discussed in the next paragraph. 
As mentioned earlier, in order to increase overall performance and scalability, REST 
was introduced with the intention and vision of being implemented and used in distrib-
uted hypermedia systems, leading to higher performing and more maintainable architec-
ture. The principles of REST and how it operates usually, if not always, resemble the 
operative functions of a website, as the features act similarly to making a call from a 
client to a server, which then sends data back over the HTTP protocol. The requests 
look similar, but the responses are completely different when an API is accessed direct-
ly over the web, as Figure 2.4 indicates. 
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Figure 2.4: A live capture of a direct API request to Google Maps Geo. 
 
The results illustrated in Figure 2.4 appear to be exceedingly complex and at first sight 
they seem to have no informative ground. However, the results are represented as a Ja-
vaScript object notation or JSON formatted data. The structured data are displayed by 
organizing the queries of key-value pairs or parameters, such as 
/maps/api/geocode/json, which were used in Figure 2.4, and restricting the results to 
address=Pori&sensor=false. This type of JSON can also be implemented in such ap-
plications as Buddy Searcher, which will be introduced in Section 5. 
From the Social Device point of view, all the exposed web services available for access 
or, in other words, online APIs, are executable but in different web service points. From 
a more in-depth perspective, Social Devices publish web services that allow other de-
velopers to call them with their own code, thus consuming the available services. The 
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part played by NodeJS in the Social Devices concept will be introduced next in order to 
link together how these concepts work in web application development. 
2.3.4 NodeJS as Operative in Social Devices 
Node was mentioned in subsection 2.3.1, where the overall architectures were intro-
duced. In more detail, the core principle of Node is to enable JavaScript, which used to 
be confined to browsers, and successfully allow it to run on a device. As JavaScript runs 
in the browser, it means that it can only access a webpage. However, if JavaScript were 
to be introduced into an environment where it could be run, a whole new world would 
open up. With Node it is now possible to access the files on devices, which it would 
normally be impossible to do with JavaScript [4]. It is also possible to listen to network 
traffic or the specific HTTP requests received by any device used and if chosen, to send 
a file back. The ultimate change is that with Node, databases can be accessed directly. 
Node.JS is used for two main purposes: the first aim is to take advantage of certain utili-
ties which can be developed later on a device, mainly for building JavaScript files, mak-
ing it possible to listen to file system changes, and do live reloads. The second aim for 
Node is mainly to build web servers, or in other words, a web application with Node. 
Figure 2.5 shows the basic principle difference between blocking and non-blocking 
connections. The blocking pseudo code for dynamically displaying a chosen name after 
which a person’s data would be downloaded, decodes the data and finally displays the 
name. While the download function reaches to the web to run it, the actual program is 
completely blocked. Although this has always been the most common way to download 
data from a server, NodeJs offers an alternative, a non-blocking solution. 
As mentioned in the description, Node uses an event-driven model, making it extremely 
light and efficient. This particular model makes Node perfect for real-time applications 
running across distributed devices, especially if the environment is data-intensive [4]. 
Furthermore, as Node is considered event-based and non-blocking, users do not have to 
wait for results before moving forward. This is covered in more detail in Figure 2.5 and 
by the following example. 
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Figure 2.5: Demonstration of code executions for both blocking and nonblocking varia-
tions in NodeJS. 
 
Although the Node code appears confusing when applied to a server, it allows the use of 
event loops, creating an “always on” concurrency model, which in simpler terms means 
that JavaScript waits for an event to happen, and whenever that particular event occurs, 
a call-back function is executed. This can be translated into an everyday example such 
as a mailman delivering mail: 
Every single piece of mail represents an event of its own in the event loop, which in this 
scenario, is represented by the mailman. Each of these events is to be delivered in a cer-
tain order. For each of the letters, the mailman walks a certain distance to deliver that 
letter using a particular route, which now represents the call-back function assigned to 
the event. Furthermore, the mailman can only walk one single code path at once.  
However, there is a possibility that while the mailman is walking the path, he can be 
given a new letter. This is because the call-back function that the mailman is coded to 
walk has emitted another letter. Should this happen, the mailman will deliver the newest 
letter immediately due to the fact that the letter was handed to him directly instead of at 
the post office, making the new letter a priority. By diverging from the current code 
path, the mailman will deliver the prioritized letter following the newly formulated path, 
after which the original route that emitted the event can then be continued. 
For Social Devices, Node creates virtually endless possibilities, such as writing server- 
side JavaScript to handle database connections or as in the upcoming use cases, to con-
nect to web APIs. Each Social Device application or program can be considered as a 
node of its own in a larger network and can be called by other nodes in other parts of the 
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network or, with the correct network bridging, even from an outside network if so cho-
sen. This allows for easy reuse and rapid evolution of code, making Node one of the 
most powerful languages in Social Device development. 
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3. SAFE DATA PRACTICES AND LIMITATIONS IN 
SOCIAL DEVICES 
After decades of mobile application development a vast selection particularly of social 
applications that allow some kind of sharing of information have appeared. The main 
issue with these ingenious social applications is that it is dauntingly easy and routine to 
locate people using them [13].  
Unfortunately, in the case of smartphones, we are willingly carrying a location-aware 
wiretap in our pockets every day. Equipping a wiretap with a camera itself is bad 
enough, but our phones are capable of documenting so much more: our movement pat-
terns, basic comings and goings, and who we come across either just passing by or en-
gaging in conversation [15].  
Our mobile devices could be used as a tool of destruction but fortunately all the pressure 
can be off-loaded onto application developers to solve this problem, regarding our po-
tential sensing social devices. Luckily for us, smartphones offer a vast variety of bene-
fits too, such as being the number one communication tool in the world, supporting so-
cial networking, stimulating productivity and innovation, which means that as our 
smartphones evolve, technology evolve with them. 
Concerns about privacy and whether it has been breached is a topical question. There is 
no one true solution for preserving our privacy due to the simple fact that our operating 
patterns and behaviors are always different. The burgeoning online media expose a con-
siderable amount of information about the owners themselves, the subjects, and the con-
tent of the viral media itself. It is interesting to see and study how users make their pri-
vacy decisions when they are dealing with online content, and whether there are certain 
patterns when using these social media sharing environments. One more important 
question to be asked is whether people even care about location disclosure, or exposing 
themselves, because there are no guarantees that one’s location would be safe in the first 
place. 
The understanding of what the ownership of data actually stands for varies considera-
bly. The common opinions are that it either refers to the plain possession of data, or 
manifesting true responsibility while producing and maintaining data. In Social Device 
environments, the true identity of ownership is both of these. The core identities of So-
cial Devices do not mean merely having the ability to access data. Instead, the core re-
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volves around creating, modifying, storing, and deriving benefits. Furthermore, the core 
ultimately bestows privileges on individuals using these applications or participating in 
Social Device environments. This section is dedicated to analyzing the nature of data 
possession and how it coexists with Social Devices. 
Evidently, every piece of gathered data has essential value as a by-product of infor-
mation processing. Social Devices form a multi-platform component environment, no 
matter what momentary use case may occur; the user base expects privacy in all types 
of interaction. The users start creating bonds and strong relationships, which later 
evolve into relationships of trust. While receiving access to personal data within gray 
boundaries depends on both the concept and the desired outcomes, the actual acceptance 
required by both parties involved in the interaction is commonly taken for granted. 
Furthermore, connecting both user and device in a new device-to-device-to-users envi-
ronment automatically generates extensive amounts of data, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
This generated data can be gathered and analyzed later on. Maintaining privacy in such 
environments creates enormous benefits as well as unpredictable challenges. For exam-
ple, referring to the Medical Dispenser concept introduced later in Section 4, allowing 
users with serious health conditions to work with their personal doctors to create an en-
vironment where all manner of objects have their own digital presence and the ability to 
communicate with other objects and / or people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: An illustration of situational data gathered from daily routines [17]. 
 
Additionally, as Social Devices thrive from creating situations where data are ex-
changed, the more data given to the systems that obtain data while interacting with us-
ers, arguably the more the line of privacy will fade.  
In general, preserving privacy is valid in every situation where data can be mined or 
transmitted. As the trend of sharing increases day by day, so does the concern that only 
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a few pieces of data, which can be mined from either one source or multiple sources, 
may create a digital fingerprint that is highly traceable. Nowadays, users are creating 
limitless amounts of personal data with all their connected devices. These devices may 
either be in the possession of end users with mainly personal products or the devices 
may also be multiple inter-connected devices in one big environment [7]. 
Along with the facts mentioned above and referring to Figure 3.1, the potential risks of 
interacting enable unauthorized access and misuse of personal information, facilitate 
attacks on other systems, and finally create general safety risks. These occurrences can 
be considered more of a security issue but this interaction acts as a transition towards 
the general concerns of privacy and covering data [19].  
In Social Device environments there are two types of risks. Firstly, the risks can be con-
sidered direct when there is a leak of a collection of personal data or, depending on the 
purpose of use, even of confidential financial information. Secondly, the risks can be 
regarded as delicate or sensitive, such as account information; the general volume of 
data created by social devices can vary from small fractions to large scale sensitive data. 
With sensing devices sharing information, leaking collections of data such as personal 
information, habits, locations, and moreover physical conditions may, without proper 
privacy allocations, allow an outside entity that has not directly collected sensitive in-
formation, to infer it. 
Multiple different types of scenarios can be affected by situational data, which is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.1. Whether it is our daily personal interactions with family, 
friends, or co-workers, these situations all create data. As we propagate our routines, 
more situational data are generated. Imagine a scenario no more complex than grocery 
shopping or a quick visit to the ATM. Both of these quick interactions leave a stamp of 
when and where these occurrences took place. Pieces of user history are generated and 
can be mined to form patterns.  
In addition, situational data are formulated on the basis of situations. In this particular 
case, situations refer to locations, time of day, or situations altered by a variable. For 
example, at a certain time of day, an individual would walk to a coffee shop near his / 
her office and purchase a beverage. The situational data would now compose of a time 
stamp, should it be morning coffee, the location in which the coffee was purchased, and 
a variable could be concerned such as a friend appearing and altering the choice of cof-
fee shop (altering all of the above-mentioned scenarios) or simply the weather, as for 
example, on a rainy day, the daily stamp would not occur. 
Moreover, in environments where Social Devices exist, the massive amounts of granu-
lar data will eventually allow those who have access to the data to perform analyses, 
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which are impossible to do at the beginning state while the data sets are still quite poor. 
In general, while providing beneficial services to users is mandatory to satisfy them, the 
possibility of misuse where the enabling of sensitive collections such as behavior pat-
terns arises as unauthorized use or use by unauthorized individuals. 
A valid approach for preserving the integrity of Social Devices lies in data minimiza-
tion. The concept of data minimization implies that companies limit the amount of data 
gathered. Data will inevitably be gathered and companies should dispose of it after it 
has fulfilled its purpose. As long as there exist estimations of which pieces of data are 
crucial, the minimization of risks and the maximization of the potential benefits and 
innovations for Social Devices can also guarantee and preserve the privacy of partaking 
users [8]. 
Restricting data collection also has the power to severely limit the potential of beneficial 
uses in certain situations. If certain minimization rules are set too strictly, prohibiting 
sets of data from being gathered or restricting them, it could lead to the loss of potential-
ly useful data sets and the lack of future development for the application in question. 
This demonstrates the difficulties in finding the happy medium between user safety and 
application development [20].  
Furthermore from Social Devices’ perspective, it was also suggested that restricting 
background data could possibly limit the amount of unwanted information to be leaked 
device-wise. As the tested devices were Android based devices (in the beginning of the 
project) limiting access would be straightforward by enforcing the OS settings. This 
could be done for example by enabling the developer mode. By doing this, an active 
application would no longer be able to decide whether to observe its own accessing 
rules. In other words: that selected device running a particular Social Devices applica-
tion would no more let that said application access the network unless it is running in 
the foreground. One thing that makes this difficult to test is proximity. WiFi will be-
come one of the dominant methods of connecting (or possibly Bluetooth). The problem 
being; while using WiFi, it overruns these settings and allows connections to be made 
freely, making this data leak limiting hard to prove to be worthwhile. 
In conclusion, whether we as individuals act as data creators or consumers, we have the 
responsibility to participate in delimiting the appropriate ground for gathering data.  We 
do not want to hoard our own data but instead to share the data to promote innovations. 
The aim of Social Devices from the start has been to inquire what the users want and 
protect the parties involved in any interactions. Even though privacy has become the 
new appraisal criterion for individuals and larger entities, it must be seen as an oppor-
tunity to assess the benefits and costs in an efficient way. By developing new standards 
for applications (like AcOP) and keeping things simple yet safe, both the users and de-
velopers will obtain the desired outcome. Social Devices meet the balance between 
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providing innovative features and ways to mitigate against the growing concerns of 
‘dataholics’ by means of standardization, regulations, and simplification.  
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4. TRUST AND PRIVACY PRIORITIZATION 
As the concept of smart devices is to make our lives both more efficient and effective, 
the real opportunities and, more importantly, the dangers have to come into considera-
tion. However, there will be a fluctuation between privacy and trust depending on the 
use of a selected device after a certain adequate base “security” has been established. 
This section is dedicated to analyzing the privacy-trust representation illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.1 (page 22) in the light of the upcoming use cases, followed by an overall analysis 
of trust and privacy in Social Devices. 
4.1 Understanding Privacy and Trust in Social Device Envi-
ronments 
One of the most critical observations regarding privacy and trust implementation is that 
it is often non-trivial for programmers to enforce certain privacy policies. As applica-
tions tend to emphasize information flows, separately implemented policies for ensuring 
and protecting sensitive values of information from other functionalities are a rising 
concern [18]. 
For the time being, all the approaches for asserting trust revolve around the propagation 
of known values of trust. A trust value is assigned by the users themselves in trusted 
networks, as they use the application and evaluate its pros and cons. Their conclusions 
provide an assessment of their level of trust in the app, whether it is worth using and 
how much personal data have to be shared to use it.  
A secondary value of trust is the assumption that all social-based applications share the 
same levels of trust. This triggers the illusion and the effect that users using these plat-
forms have difficulties differentiating between trusted users. These assumptions cause 
issues. Users making their own decisions based solely on their limited knowledge of the 
potentially wide user base, relying on recommendations set by either other users or pos-
sibly the application itself causes so-called “tunnel vision”, which slowly erodes the 
potential trust bonds.  
As all the application examples in this thesis are centered on dependencies on social 
interactions, continuously reading or sharing content with connected devices, the above-
mentioned point of certain assumptions being made solely on beliefs and hunches is 
substantial to a certain extent. In real life, we do not trust everybody in the same way 
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and moreover we continuously make trust judgements about other people / users by 
relying on our intuition. 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of a use case privacy-trust graph. 
 
All of the use cases described below can be seen as concepts with devices that sense 
their surroundings, thus gaining a real voice and utility. Possessing multiple devices 
capturing specific yet completely different data and communicating either through or 
about the data, truly contributes to contextualizing heterogeneous systems. It is essential 
to acknowledge how to assess the point where those miniscule pieces of collected data 
turn into a true unit of information, which represents the real value and in the worst cas-
es, the real danger. 
Meet and Greet – The Meet and Greet application is an extremely straightforward one. 
The required privacy and trust represent the minimum level of user requirements in the 
light of the fanfare use case. 
Additionally, even if the use case were slightly different, say a contact information 
swapping application operating in a conference where contact information was shared 
between the participants when proximity requirements were met, the operating principle 
would not change much. At this particular point of the digital era, acquiring phone 
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numbers and names is remarkably easy. As long as the privacy side of the application is 
guaranteed, the users will automatically assume a certain level of trust where the contact 
information will not be leaked by any of the other users. 
Media Share – Sharing various pieces of data is an everyday occurrence for the majori-
ty of mobile device users worldwide. As for the voluntary nature of this occurrence, on 
the other hand, it is not always clear. Ensuring the privacy of users who are sharing any 
given media is always a high priority. Whether it is photographs or videos, the old say-
ing holds true: a picture is worth a thousand words. As we share data, it quickly evolves 
into information and that very information creates context. Users demand that very 
same context when operating any application and, with applications such as Media 
Share, the data involved automatically communicates with other pieces of data in order 
to have a working meaning. 
Let us imagine a scenario where the users compile a story by taking either photographs 
or short video clips that will be chained together to create a video story. As long as eve-
rything is protected and managed by a more or less unbiased party according to the us-
ers, they do not really concern themselves with trust towards other users. This argument 
is not one hundred percent accurate as some of the users will still have a valid concern 
about who has access to their photos or videos, as illustrated in 5.1. Arguably, at the 
same time, this concern can be seen as invalid as the users have agreed to the user 
agreements whem using that particular application, which guarantees unwavering priva-
cy and uniform trust. 
Buddy Searcher – This socially charged application model thrives on situational data. 
By analyzing the locations a user “logs into” through Social Devices, a stamp could be 
produced indicating the current time and location, e.g., a restaurant or a bar and sharing 
it with a group of friends, should this be the intended and desired operation. Further-
more, a search field could be added to locate your friends as some sort of user check-in 
history feature.  
Additionally, an action could be triggered by entering the premises of a friend. An indi-
cator would pop up letting the user know someone is close by without doing a search, if 
this person is on a friends list. This feature could also function as a reminder or a notifi-
cation, announcing that a group of friends have got together at a bar nearby and the user 
should also go. 
Taking into consideration the operating principle of this application, it is important to 
notice that the trust factor acts as a more relevant indicator than privacy. As mentioned 
previously, similar adaptations of this application are already in use and, surprisingly, 
individuals using these applications are not particularly concerned about leaked infor-
mation. This creates a problem for privacy. 
25 
 
Every tag that is made by a user creates a little piece of the story of their everyday life. 
The concerns that arise because it remains a mystery what happens to those stories after 
they have been told. Managing such information should not be taken lightly, as what 
happens to the information collected by the taggers and who actually controls it is still 
unclear.  
Depending on the situation, meaning whether the users are family or a group of friends 
or just semi acquaintances, the trust factor fluctuates in various directions. As users we 
are mainly concerned about who has access to our data and what is done with it, but at 
the same time it is easily overlooked if we have a trusted bond with someone. Moreo-
ver, the trust factor can fluctuate the other way around where certain activities are more 
suitable for sharing with a friend rather than a family member, e.g., paying a visit to a 
marriage counsellor. 
Furthermore, applications that have the ability to monitor movements also have the ca-
pability of calculating our preferences and actually suggesting various activities, de-
pending on our current location, for example, from an automated coffee maker to much 
bigger components, which will be discussed later. 
It is safe to say that the stories that are told keep evolving constantly and how they actu-
ally evolve is up to the users, who have to be aware of what is “put out there” while 
using this type of application. Collecting data has gone beyond identifying information 
and individuals as it slowly progresses to depicting our lives and movements from no-
value content into an actual narration of the lives of users who choose to use the service. 
Medical Dispenser – As technology moves forward and the population ages, certain 
changes to the state of one’s health can be perceived differently. Soon it will become 
commonplace to be able to “visit the doctor” from home. The Medical Dispenser acts as 
a medication intake reminder device. It is specifically custom designed for individuals 
with daily medications such as blood pressure medication or even for patients with Alz-
heimer’s. The Dispenser recognizes the counter-part that a patient always carries with 
them at home, e.g., a watch, a phone, or in the future some sort of bio-tag implanted 
under the skin. When a certain physical proximity occurs between the counter-part and 
the Dispenser, it runs a true value check to ensure that the daily dosage has already been 
taken and informs the patient.  
The operation can also work vice versa, meaning that the Dispenser reminds the patient 
to take the dosage if it has not yet been taken. The reminder can be a simple sound noti-
fication enforced with a display on the Dispenser, stating the results of the value check.   
The Medical Dispenser represents the high-end requirements for both privacy and trust, 
yet there are situations where both of these can be overlooked. The Medical Dispenser 
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exemplifies the maximum level of both privacy and trust in a sensitive medication situa-
tion. With applications such as medicine reminders, the actual value that is on the line is 
extremely valuable to the individual using the device. It not only represents a record of 
what is happening at home but an actual bio profile / record, generated by a sensor, 
which is later analyzed by another party, in this case the medical staff in charge of the 
medication and treatment. In situations like this, the users have the right to know what 
data are being collected and for what purpose but unfortunately there is no real possibil-
ity to prevent the collection of the data. 
Furthermore, situations where medicine dispensing is still sensitive but the people 
around the individuals using the application have a comfortable bond with the user 
change the need for privacy and trust. Medication that could be embarrassing for the 
user, e.g., for STDs, is a highly personal matter but in circumstances of a very close 
group of individuals, disclosing that particular information with an aural reminder from 
the OJS device might only cause laughter without any other repercussions. 
As shown in all of the use cases, trust and our willingness to share do not always auto-
matically correlate with privacy. Whether we are making contacts, sharing media and 
creating stories, or leaving digital fingerprints behind, the desire to be creative and in-
spirational to generate actual insight for the future is real. As long as we can protect and 
manage our own stories in conventional ways to satisfy individual desires to ensure ad-
equate privacy, we will always create content in spite of the data created and surrounded 
by our conversations, whether they are traditional or prompted by Social Devices. 
Vasudevan and Owusu state in [11] that as the post-PC era is coming to an end, we as 
users and developers are placing a great deal of dependence on our mobile devices and, 
in all honesty, these devices are still insecure.  
In an optimal Social Device scenario, we have to analyze the environment into which 
we are about to release our more or less finished product. The responsibility and under-
standing toward mobile device platforming, which is currently dealing with access and 
providing an opportunity for high-end development, give us the leverage for innovation 
and future research. 
In Social Device environments, an enormous amount of trust has been placed in mobile 
devices. With the vast possibilities for application development suggested in this sec-
tion, more or less sensitive data and highly confidential information are at stake, and 
need to be protected. As a side note it can be stated that currently, even though we have 
surpassed the PC era, mobile operating systems are untrustworthy compared to desktop 
operating systems. Even though mobile devices in principle try to be more secure, in 
practice they are still highly vulnerable, mainly due to their complexity. 
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4.2 Protecting Trust in Social Devices 
The points that are raised in this section exemplify the main point of this entire thesis; 
namely, it is important to comprehend that users are both the source and the problem of 
creating reliable trust in Social Device environments. This is mainly due to difficulties 
in understanding the concept of data discretion, which applies to both personal and col-
laborative users, depending on the purposes of a selected application. For example, in 
the Media Share app the operation is quite simple. A problem could arise if a user in a 
collaborative environment creates inappropriate content and shares it or abuses other 
user information, thus spoiling the user experience for others. In turn, personal applica-
tions like the MeD app have a high trust component as the processed data is extremely 
personal. In this scenario, the user already knows how delicate the data is and trusts the 
other party, e.g. the physician, without question. 
 
Earlier in this section, privacy and trust relations were described by means of various 
use cases for Social Devices. As certain assumptions were made, not all the speculations 
are definite. For instance, using the Meet and Greet application can lead to awkward and 
potentially dramatic situations. The basic principle is simple as the application is only 
meant to acknowledge proximity parameters and the acknowledgement itself is a prede-
termined sound. Whether this sound is a whistle or a formal greeting, the trust parame-
ter remains immutable.  
However, with crafty users, if the acknowledgement is changed to a possibly racist 
sound or exclamation, depending on the situation and the location, the consequences 
will become unpredictable, which will tip the trust scale. As the scale tips, the privacy-
trust gauge shifts correspondingly. This example illustrates the fact that it is impossible 
to substantiate how privacy and trust react until every possible scenario has been cov-
ered in real time.  
The main problem as mentioned previously is users with a lack of data discretion. For 
the sake of humor or harm, every user can potentially be considered ‘dangerous’ even if 
the application itself is safe privacy-wise. 
Moreover, in Social Device environments, on some occasions it is possible to have cer-
tain space allocations with an unknown quantity of collaborating devices, sensors, or 
non-determined gadgets. This means that data will be constantly generated, transmitted, 
and stored. In contrast to all the transmissions and interactions, the amount of sensitive 
data is a concern for users, especially with trust issues.  
The reasons for these issues are many, but in terms of Social Devices, certain assump-
tions can be made. For instance, with a variety of application possibilities, the environ-
ment itself is often unfamiliar to the users. In addition, the trust relationships that users 
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come across in Social Device environments differ in that, occasionally, the users do not 
have a trust relationship with the owners of the environment in such a way that they 
might have with their local administrators for private information handling, e.g., net-
work service operators in which a more or less genuine relationship has been estab-
lished. 
With regard to the application opportunities for Social Devices, users’ rights for access-
ing certain functions and interactive modules will dynamically change, with their rela-
tionship with that particular mechanism generating data in environments which might 
not even be predetermined.  
As there are no particular reasons for users not to form their own ad hoc groups, refer-
ring to Media Share, and using cameras to record interactions in a conference room for 
example, the camera action is certainly administered by the environment even though it 
might appear that the application is in charge of it.  
Moreover, the users should not have access to the produced video outside of the meet-
ing period. As the environment also adapts as it is being associated with pieces of in-
formation, limitations for users accessing the pieces of information generated in the 
meeting have to be laid down. 
The use cases introduced in this thesis are decentralized, meaning that there can be mul-
tiple sources and outputs for the data. Users must have guarantees that there will be no 
caching or data replication over the required amount as there is usually no single point 
where access and control can be enforced. When possibly large groups of users are in-
volved, all protection schemes must allow efficient sharing among legitimate users 
without endangering said users. This is how trust is enforced. 
Duan and Canny introduce an interesting claim in their paper [10]: “Unless there is a 
clearly stated protection policy and scheme in place, together with provisions for con-
vincing verification, users will not be comfortable trusting the infrastructure with their 
data. And this in turn will hinder the acceptance and limit the usefulness of such sys-
tems.” However, for Social Devices this means that the generated data are relatively 
easy to protect even though the data can be generated by another user or party, which is 
not the case. This complicates the trust bonding as users are required to trust the sys-
tems and infrastructures to begin with to a certain degree.  
Blind trust cannot be forced upon users. Instead, by performing certain operations, the 
infrastructures and environments can be developed in a way that promotes trust and 
confidence amongst users even before any major commissioning has occurred. 
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4.3 Privacy-Oriented Social Devices 
Social Devices is heavily focused on collecting data, as stated earlier. Much of the col-
lected data used for further development may be extremely sensitive. As the data 
streams can also be heavy, they have to be dealt with in real-time. This can be done by 
protecting the privacy aspect of Social Devices.  
It could even be said that privacy, in the sense of pure coding, offers the solutions for 
effective control of access data, especially in ubiquitous environments. The coding is 
also responsible for ensuring that no minor or major disorders that enable unauthorized 
breaches or open backdoors are a possibility. Should these disorders become valid, it 
can lead to privacy violations and in the more severe consequences described in a later 
section. 
Regarding privacy, the desired function is to enable secure execution without any major 
issues during interactions. Especially with mobile devices, as the wish list of features 
increases, problems tend to occur, and how privacy for users can be offered includes a 
multitude of guaranteed aspects.  
The below-mentioned concepts are mainly to be used as desired guidelines rather than 
factual implementations that work in every situation. The principles of secured data 
streams and safe storing are not new by any means; however, the illustrated concepts 
can be used in new ways that are yet to be developed to enable true privacy with appli-
cation development. The aberrations and privacy breaches that occur are usually 
manmade. These breaches may be either intentional or unintentional, depending on 
what type of breach has been made. Coding errors are an everyday incident that can lead 
to leaked data or unsafe environments for a vast amount of devices, yet most of the time 
these incidents are unintentional, although impossible to avoid.  
Moreover, intentional privacy breaches are solely meant to harm the environment, the 
users, and the integrity of the data at stake. These breaches usually occur more rarely 
but usually the damage dealt is greater than from unintentional coding errors. To avoid 
such breaches in Social Device environments and also in general, the following con-
cepts might offer the solutions. 
Isolated Execution – “Isolated Execution (IE) is a software reference implementation 
of the ‘security through isolation’ concept.” [11] This can easily be interpreted mainly 
as a security issue; however, this also offers an opportunity for measuring and improv-
ing privacy and even trust. While this execution enables the possibility to run pieces of 
software in complete isolation, it provides both secrecy and integrity for code and data 
run in a certain module of an application in this case. The only problem with IE is that 
currently the operating systems in mobile devices provide isolation for applications and 
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other resources. Moreover, this protection can be bypassed when the operating system 
itself is compromised. Should this be fixed by, for example, running a parallel environ-
ment within an existing environment yet still acting as a separate coprocessor, this could 
severely reduce the scope of human error initiating unwanted processes or events [11].  
IE would allow the user to decide whether to open or share files depending on the con-
fidence the user has in the file origin. Similar to sandboxing, this type of concept could 
be implemented within Social Devices in some desired fashion in order to limit the 
‘damage’ to isolated environments, leaving the users unharmed. 
Trusted Pathing – Trusted Pathing (TP) is designed to protect communication authen-
ticity and, optionally, secrecy and availability between software and a peripheral, in this 
case a mobile device. When used with human-interface devices, trusted pathing allows a 
user to ascertain precisely the application with which that particular user is currently 
interacting [11].  
For Social Devices, the concept of trusted pathing is crucial if the intention is to embark 
above the novelty level of applications. With fully trusted path support, malicious appli-
cations spoofing the originals, by creating user interfaces that look identical to the legit-
imate applications, will conceivably become virtually ineffective and useless. Should 
this trusted path be absent, the consequences could be horrific. The only issue with 
Trusted Paths is that building them to be secure can be a challenging task, depending on 
the desired function and application, especially when the amount of devices multiplies 
even to a handful of devices, let alone dozens or even hundreds of devices. 
4.4 Trust from the Users’ Perspective 
Social Devices thrive on protecting the anonymity of the users in communicating envi-
ronments where data are captured. Apart from the tracking application introduced in this 
thesis, designated pieces of information will be essential for the functionalities of the 
applications. Users will expose themselves and their identity to parts of these systems, 
but the locations will be concealed. With control and feedback, privacy is easier to pre-
serve, although it is nearly impossible to camouflage from personal information derived 
from a variety of sources. As interactions are shared between collaborative users, these 
collected pieces of information can be filtered. Users may also have several pseudo-
nyms and as they act through their unique action patterns, even with multiple tags, pin-
pointing or fingerprinting users is possible. However, attempts to make a connection 
between a tag and a user’s real-life identity are unlikely. 
The principles for pursuing and fulfilling privacy follow the considerations of Marc 
Langheinrich [12], who suggested six guidelines for privacy-aware system design: 
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 Notice – Users should always be aware of what data are being collected. 
 Choice and Consent – Users should be able to choose whether the collected da-
ta are used or not. 
 Anonymity – Pseudonymity should apply when identity is not needed.  
 Meeting Expectations – Systems should mimic real-world norms. 
 Security – Different amounts of protection depending on the situation. 
 Access and Recourse – Users should have access to data about them. 
These principles summarize the fact that user data protection is related to privacy. Not 
only can certain techniques be used for protecting and ensuring privacy, but privacy 
considerations can and will influence protection policies and implementations. Privacy 
will not be compromised until the schemes in use suffer from dishonesty, meaning that 
both the servers and fragments of collected data are assumed to be honest and safe, un-
less detected as contaminated after all. Finally, these principles reinforce the fact that 
unauthorized monitoring must be detected, but at a reasonable cost, without endanger-
ing users and then again by not caging them with brute force, creating a ‘Big Brother’ 
type of scenario. 
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5. PRIVACY BREACHES IN SOCIAL DEVICES 
In the current world, there are certain individuals who will always take up the challenge 
of breaking applications in some form, turning them against other users either just to 
cause harm for the sake of it or to gather delicate user information, which is not meant 
to be leaked anywhere. It is safe to say that every piece of equipment enabling some sort 
of cellular phone and laptop activity amongst users causes a different level of damage, 
depending on how we, as users, regard the harm. 
 
Users tend to neglect privacy concerns and almost blindly believe the guarantees given 
by certain application developers about privacy and how users should be and feel safe. 
Unknowingly, these same users feel empowered by these applications and interact as 
they are supposed to, based on their attitudes and behavior. Too often the application 
user interface contains technologies for specifying certain rules and machine learning 
that subliminally refine user behavior. We adopt these applications differently, we see 
the usage purposes how we want to see them, and it is the purposes that cause the prob-
lems. These problems will be covered in more detail in this section. 
5.1 Meet and Greet Case (MnG) 
For the purpose of this example, picture a plausible scenario where either complete 
strangers or friends meet face to face in an elevator, for example, with mobile phones 
equipped with hardware capable of running OJS or other SD services on their own de-
vices and specific software. The software running in the background will acknowledge 
both of these devices through Bluetooth or an actual mobile network. When a certain 
proximity requirement is met, the device will establish a short period connection, as 
shown in Figure 5.1, and generate the sound of a fanfare with applause, letting both of 
the individuals know that they are using the same of piece of software. 
For an arbitrary use case such as this, there are hardly any privacy issues, even consider-
ing the anonymity of the users. In order for a device to perform an action of this magni-
tude, no greater effort is needed as the software itself is extremely light and the per-
formed action requires no extra effort. 
It is possible for a perpetrator to gain access to the established connection; however, 
there would not be much benefit from it. The intruder would only gain the information 
that two, or in larger crowds several, devices established a short period HTTP connec-
tion without leaking any personal information. The odds of these same devices estab-
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lishing another connection in a short period of time would be unlikely, thus making the 
effort not worth the value gained. 
 
Figure 5.1: A successful Meet and Greet acknowledgement. 
 
Additionally, in order to gain something concrete, the devices would have to be in the 
same wireless network, and the perpetrator would have had to set up a scanner to moni-
tor the activities in the network and then poison the routing protocols, which is impossi-
ble without knowing the server address. In terms of privacy, Meet and Greets are on the 
lowest level of privacy requirements. 
5.2 Media Share Case (MSh) 
In this use case, the desired action is to share a piece of media between selected users. 
The mechanics of media sharing is as follows: two individuals using software dedicated 
to sharing, e.g., video clips, with one another are in a certain proximity measured by an 
OJS, as shown in Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of media share principles. 
 
The server acknowledges the individual’s desire to share pieces of information in this 
open type of environment and the devices will then establish a connection and com-
mence sharing video clips with one another. 
When assessing the privacy of such an implementation, the number one concern is an 
MITM attack. As the devices use HTTPS to secure their connections, there is a small 
window of time where the devices are vulnerable. As the server acknowledges two de-
vices willing to share data, it is possible for a third party individual to poison the routing 
tables of the devices. In order for this to work properly, the address space has to be cal-
culable and the server must be centralized. 
Additionally, for the intruder to perform the attacks successfully, the correct time to 
strike is before the devices establish their HTTPS connections. All the devices will 
acknowledge the server when they are close enough to trigger the proximity radar. At 
this particular moment, all the traffic will be done as HTTP before the server commands 
the devices to use HTTPS. If an intruder manages to hijack the connections at this par-
ticular time, it is possible to start rerouting the devices’ traffic through the intruder’s 
device, which now appears to be the server for the rest of the devices, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of a successful MITM rerouting attack. 
 
This type of attack is true poison for privacy. In this example, the locations and the 
number of participating devices are limited, but it is possible to perform these attacks on 
a much larger scale, as they are extremely hard to discover when done properly. Imag-
ine a situation where the attacker starts to modify either messages or the data in transit. 
This type of situation can be described with a modified real life example: Imagine send-
ing a simple letter to someone as the MITM attack commences. The attacker could 
modify that message to include anything imaginable, maybe just a favor asking for 
money. The text itself might not appear identical, but it could match the additional re-
quest word for word. As long as the attacker was doing this the entire time, the recipient 
would not notice the difference. 
Additionally, should the recipient write back and include some money, the attacker 
could once again alter the letter, keep the money, and send the letter forward. This 
would require slightly more work in the so-called offline world, but the tricks are en-
dorsable and much easier to do online, where all this could be automated by software or 
made possible through an advertised free Wi-Fi router which would later infect all the 
connections. 
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5.3 Buddy Searcher Case (BS) 
This next example could be considered as some sort of local search and discovery ser-
vice application, specifically for mobile phones. The operation of the application is 
somewhat similar to an existing application called Foursquare, which is commonly used 
within social networking sites such as Facebook. Foursquare operates by taking into 
account the places a user visits and forwarding that information to other users that allow 
a certain level of trust with other users. This enables the function to recommend places 
around a user’s current location. For this use case, the principle of the function is slight-
ly different.  
This search and locator resembles a GPS, as shown in Figure 5.4. It is mainly meant for 
use amongst trusted individuals, close friends or family, allowing them to see which 
places a user has visited at which hour and possibly the date of the occurrence if so se-
lected. 
 
Figure 5.4: Illustration of a location stamp. 
 
The application could even have a function that allows the user to set an ongoing cur-
rent location that is tracked or a built-in application with physical proximity scanners. 
For example, in Figure 5.4, the user could set their current location and the tracker 
would keep the status open unless the individual leaves the proximity, after which the 
application adds a tag that informs other users that the individual they have a trusted 
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bond with has left that particular area at a certain time of the day and is once again on 
the move. 
At first this type of application sounds highly risky, which indeed it is in the event of an 
MITM attack. A scenario is presented in Figure 5.5 where an individual has used the 
particular tagging application for a day or even several days. With digital fingerprints, 
calculating routines on a daily basis becomes much more probable. Surprisingly, even a 
small amount of location data could project the current whereabouts of an individual, 
should a perpetrator somehow manage to infect all the scanners that a user has been 
connected to or get hold of the information that the application collects and afterwards 
shares with trusted users. 
 
Figure 5.5: An illustration of a user’s calculated daily routine. 
 
As the application stands, both the privacy and the trust components are highly valuable 
to the user no matter the situation. Should this kind of motion information be leaked, it 
would act as the worst kind of GPS possible. Even in the situation where the application 
only collected anonymous information, it could be considered highly perilous and with 
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a vast amount of both gathered and processed data it is even possible to isolate the tags 
to deduct who the actual user is, exposing them to zero privacy subsequently. 
  
5.4 Medical Dispenser Case (MeD) 
For the purpose of this use case, imagine the scenario of an elderly person who has to 
take certain doses of medicine on a daily basis, e.g., for high blood pressure. The way 
the application works, shown in Figure 5.6, is that the OJS keeps track of the medicine 
taken and informs the user if they have already exceeded the daily limit or if they still 
have to take their medicine. 
 
Figure 5.6: Illustration of the Medical Dispenser operation. 
 
The OJS receives information by scanning a trusted device worn by the user such as a 
mobile device or even a smartwatch, which makes wearing the device much more com-
fortable and less forgettable. After processing the gathered information, the OJS for-
wards the information to an outside server maintained by the hospital, where the infor-
mation can then be accessed by the doctor in charge of the medication. 
Privacy-wise, this type of application represents the end-level of privacy. Such sensitive 
information should not be leaked outside trusted individuals, which makes this applica-
tion’s need for trust as high as the need for privacy. However, depending on the medica-
tion, the level of privacy and trust might fluctuate. 
Moreover, this type of application is extremely vulnerable to MITM attacks. If in some 
way, an attacker could set up a server between the OJS and the hospital’s server and be 
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able to reroute all the traffic through the fake server, the damage would be immeasura-
ble – as illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7: An illustration of an MITM attack using a Medical Dispenser. 
 
The problem that arises with this hijacking is that as the fake server logs in for the user, 
captures their details and forwards the information, everything may seem to be operat-
ing normally and it is difficult if not impossible to detect the server sitting in the middle, 
forwarding the data back and forth and eavesdropping or actually hijacking the sensitive 
information.  
The complexity of this kind of attack is that if the devices used are equipped with effi-
cient hardware to operate on another level besides just sending to or reading a reminder 
from an OJS, the actual infected device could be the mobile phone or the smartwatch 
itself. Being infected by some sort of malware hidden in the background of the device 
or the application itself introduces the possibility of insertion between the device and 
the OJS. Additionally, there could be a scenario where the developer chooses to imple-
ment malware of this kind in order to gather sensitive information and even sell it for-
ward. 
Furthermore, the attacker could alter the reminders as they please. By tampering with 
the information, the user might end up taking lethal doses of medicine or even miss all 
the reminders throughout the day, making it just as lethal. Everything would seem fine 
on the server end as long as the device still kept sending acknowledgements, without 
actually reminding the user to take their medicine. 
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5.5 Unraveling Privacy in Social Devices 
From the perspective of developers, our abilities to understand, choose, or even control 
what personal information we share and with whom is a real challenge. With an un-
known amount of components in play, for instance identity and granularity, the traces of 
data should be well hidden so as to be practically untraceable. Traces can be mined and 
extremely difficult if not near impossible to retract once they have been shared. Need-
less to say, sharing such revealing data has a number of risks. As shown in this thesis, 
incidents involving stalkers or thieves are more than possible when using social net-
working applications. Some of these threats are visible, some are not. Since data are no 
longer gathered solely by large corporations and organizations, individuals and small 
community groups may create sensing applications and begin collecting valuable, per-
sonal data. 
As developers, we have the duty to understand the responsibilities and tasks that come 
into the equation at this point. There are ways to contribute towards individual and 
small group data protection. Especially in this sensing social device environment, we 
must ensure that we have created workable standards in our environment for our user 
community. The task generally speaking is very simple: we must actively engage indi-
viduals in their own decision making, since the data are so granular and personal. The 
aim of improving user abilities to sense and regulate their privacy is to implement a 
system to negotiate decisions based on who is asking, what they are asking, what for, 
and so forth. 
To a certain extent it is crucial to give users or participants as much control over their 
own location data as possible when talking about GPS traces, as in the Buddy Searcher 
example shown earlier. Participants must have the possibility to either make or revoke 
decisions about sharing their data with any third-party applications. Thus, analytically 
speaking, the participants using the applications are not only subjects for gathering data 
but they act like investigators when they take part in a small or large research initiative. 
As it stands, the participants should have their own input on how data are collected, 
processed, stored, and discarded. 
Should developers hesitate to tailor unique access controls and data management to 
meet the requirements of the participants, developers must at least ensure privacy by 
limiting the amount of raw data that a participant is required to share. With privacy, 
more data is not always better. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
As this Master’s thesis was aimed at examining the issues arising with privacy and trust 
regarding Social Devices, some clear main issues were detected immediately. For over-
all innovative development in the future it is essential to grasp the reality, namely, that 
where trust is concerned, users are both the source and the problem for reliable trust 
creation, because in Social Device environments, understanding the concept of data 
discretion applies to and supports personal as well as collaborative users.  
For the sake of humor or harm, every user can potentially be considered ‘dangerous,’ 
even if the application itself is safe in terms of privacy. Especially with mobile devices, 
as the wish list of features increases, problems tend to occur, and how user privacy can 
be offered includes a multitude of guaranteed aspects.  
The happy medium for success revolves of course not only around proper development 
but also by giving the users some leeway depending on the application, for instance 
adapting the guidelines by Langheinrich in [12]. The trust relationships that users come 
across in Social Device environments differ, in that occasionally users do not have a 
trust relationship with the owners of the environments. In regard to the application op-
portunities for Social Devices, users’ rights to access certain functions and interactive 
modules will dynamically change with their relationship with that particular mechanism 
that generates data in the environments. 
Additionally, as the research progressed, certain realizations were made, such as the 
function of SD implementations as an abstraction layer for all devices, making it possi-
ble to take advantage of a diversity of devices, not simply limiting the use to mobile 
devices. As regards performance, whether mobile devices are the best way to go is still 
under research, as for most applications performance is not an issue; but when envisag-
ing a heavy application that requires real-time responsiveness, certain mobile devices do 
not have the capabilities or capacity to function fast enough, hindering user experience. 
The concept of Social Devices was introduced at the beginning of the thesis. Social De-
vices functions as a unique sociological system, uniting humans and devices. Also, ad-
ditional implementations of Social Devices were presented. Both of these implementa-
tions, the Action-Oriented Programming model and OrchestratorJS, try to fulfill the 
requirements for Social Devices by, for instance keeping track of the closeness of avail-
able devices and finding a suitable configuration for said devices in the proximity of 
each other, allowing them to execute operative functions with one another. 
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Moreover, as all the application examples in this thesis revolved around dependencies 
on social interactions, which continuously read or share content with connected devices, 
the above-mentioned point of certain assumptions being made solely on beliefs and 
hunches is substantial to a certain extent.  
Our new, in most cases wireless, upcoming, and existing technologies are rapidly trans-
forming our relationships to other people and places around the globe. This means that 
the constraints that used to be valid some years ago are now simply temporal, and our 
society is stretching this line and reshaping it fundamentally to increase the capacity of 
information flows. 
In real life, we do not trust everyone in the same way but instead we continuously make 
trust judgements about other people / users by relying on our intuition. Based on all 
these observations, it can be stated that this research gives valuable insight into future 
development, which was also one of the purposes of this thesis. 
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